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CORPORATE LAW-FREEZE-OUT MERGERS-Freeze-out of mi­
nority stockholders must have a "valid business purpose"-Singer v. 
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and Tanzer v. Interna­
tional General Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). 
In two recent cases the Supre~e Court of Delaware has 
granted significantly greater rights to minority stockholders in 
freeze-out mergers l than were previously allowed. The cases repre­
sent a significant change in corporate law in Delaware and may be 
forerunners of a new judicial approach to the investigation of the 
motives behind corporate mergers. 
In Singer v. Magnavox CO.,2 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
announced a "valid business purpose" test. The test is to be 
applied in corporate freeze-outs of minority stockholders when pub­
licly held corporations "go private" by merger with another corpo­
ration, both corporations being under the control of the same 
majoritr stockholder. The "valid business purpose" test requires 
that there be some acceptable business reason for the merger other 
than eliminating an unwanted minority. 
The principle that majority stockholders have a fiduciary duty 
to minority stockholders in some situations has long been ac­
1. In the freeze-out merger, the majority stockholders cause the corporation in 
which the minority stockholders have an interest to merge with another corporation 
controlled by the majority stockholders. In the merger the majority receives addi­
tional shares in the surviving or resulting corporation while the minority stockhold­
ers receive cash for their shares. The final result is that the majority gains all of the 
equity interest in the corporation while the minority is "frozen-out." In recent years, 
there has been a significant increase in freeze-out mergers, which are used as a 
method for corporations to remove their shares from public markets (known as "go­
ing private"). In earlier years when stock prices were high many firms "went public" 
in order to take advantage of capital which was readily available, but with depressed 
stock prices, the advantage seems to' be in buying back those shares, sold to the 
public at high prices, at the current lower prices through freeze-out mergers or other 
methods. 
2. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). 
3. While the court consistently refers to "majority stockholders," there seems 
no reason to require that the stockholder have over 50% of the outstanding shares of 
either corporation for the "valid business purpose" test to apply. Since considerably 
less than 50% will usually give a stockholder operating control of a corporation, a 
"contro\" stockholder is assumed to have the same duties and rights as a "majority" 
stockholder. To conform to the court's language, this article will use the term "major­
ity" but the reader should consider a control stockholder to be in the same position. 
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cepted. 4 In the merger situation, the duty of majority stockholders 
prior to Singer had been limited to the "entire fairness"5 of the 
merger. This meant that as long as the majority had made full dis­
closure of all facts and results of a proposed merger and had not 
damaged the minority stockholders by payment of an inadequate 
price for cancellation of their interests, the majority had discharged 
its fiduciary duty. As recently as 1971,6 Delaware courts allowed 
minority interests to be removed through merger without inves­
tigating any underlying corporat~ purpose. More broadly, the 
4. In'Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), the majority stock­
holder caused the board of directors to redeem one class of stock for cash as pro­
vided in the corporate charter. Immediately thereafter, the majority caused the cor­
poration to sell assets which were greatly undervalued on the company books. The 
result was a windfall profit retained entirely by the majority stockholder. The holders 
of t\1e redeemed class of stock were successful in showing that the majority had 
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the minority. See also Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 
A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), afI'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. 
Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 
33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). 
The duty of majority stockholders has developed as an extension of the duty 
owed to stockholders by directors which was based, in turn, on the majority stock­
holders' effective control of the board of directors through their power to elect the 
board. 
On director's duty, see Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971) (corporate 
opportunity usurped by a director); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Cq., 43 Del. Ch. 
353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967) (improper stock issue reduced plaintiff's interest in cor­
poration); Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (1960) (misuse of 
corporate funds); Johnston v. Green, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956) (corpo­
rate opportunity usurped); Bennet v. Breuil Petroleum Corp.; 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 
236 (1953) (plaintiff frozen-out by reorganization and sale of stock at an inadequate 
price); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (stock trading 
on insider information); Italo-Petroleum Corp. v. Hannigan, 40 Del. 534, 14 A.2d 401 
(1940) (request for accounting by directors). 
• 5. The"entire fairness" test in an interested merger situation was first set out 
in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107 109-10 
(1952). 
6. In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 
1971), the court said: 
[P]laintiffs ... fail to recognize that under the law of merger each minority 
stockholder of Schenley has had at least constructive notice that he may be 
lawfully eliminated as such a stockholder unless the plan of corporate reor­
ganization designed to absorb his stock interest is so grossly unfair as to be 
invalid. In short, ... the rights of plaintiffs ... are not greater under the 
present Delaware merger statute here involved [long-form merger) than 
under the so-called short-merger 'statute .... Thus, if plaintiffs and others 
are not satisfied with the value placed upon their shares by Glen Alden, and 
no fraud or blatant over-reaching is demonstrated, their recourse is to an 
appraisal .... 
[d. at 35 (citations omitted). 
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courts regarded judicial scrutiny of corporate motives as inappro­
priate in most situations. 7 
In the Singer case, North American Philips Corporation (North 
American) decided to attempt to acquire the Magnavox Company 
(Magnavox) by tender offer and subsequent merger. On August 21, 
1974, North American incorporated North American Philips De­
velopment Corporation (Development) for the purpose of making a 
tender offer to the holders of outstanding shares of Magnavox. On 
August 28, 1974, Development made an offer of eight dollars ($8) 
per share to Magnavox's stockholders. The offer included full dis­
closure both of Development's intent to ultimately acquire all 
equity interest in Magnavox and of the effects of that acquisition on 
Magnavox stockholders. 
The directors of Magnavox opposed the tender offer primarily 
because of inadequate price and so informed their stockholders. 
The directors sent a letter to the stockholders which stated, in 
part, that the " 'Company was shocked at the inadequacy of the of­
fer of $8 per share in relationship to a book value in excess of $11 
... .' "8 In September of 1974, Development and Magnavox com­
promised on an offer of nine dollars ($9) per share with a two year 
employment contract for each of sixteen officers of Magnavox. The 
board of Magnavox then withdrew its opposition to the offer. As a 
result of the tender offer, Development acquired 84.1% of the 
7. While a court of equity should stand ready to prevent corporate 
fraud and any overreaching by fiduciaries of the rights of stockholders, Ben­
nett v. Breuil, 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236, by the same token this Court 
should not impede the consummation of an orderly merger under the Dela­
ware statutes, an efficient and fair method having been furnished which per­
mits a judicially protected withdrawal from a merger by a disgruntled stock­
holder.... 
Id. at 36 (citation omitted). Also, in Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 
187 A.2d 78 (1962), the court said: 
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute in 
which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set 
aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the statute is to 
provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority 
shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter the former stockholder 
has only a monetary claim. This power of the parent corporation to eliminate 
the minority is a complete answer to the plaintiff's charge of breach of trust 
against the directors .... 
Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80. In Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 
(1961), the court said: "[Tlhe reasons for a merger or the business necessity behind 
it are not matters for judicial determination...." Id. at 82-83, 174 A.2d at 30 (citation 
omitted). 
8. 380 A.2d at 971. 
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Magnavox common shares outstanding, putting it m control of 
Magnavox. 
In May of 1975, Development incorporated T.M.C. Develop­
ment Corporation (TMC) for the purpose of acquiring the remain­
ing 15.9% of Magnavox common shares through a merger of Mag­
navox into TMC under the Dela~are long form merger statute. 9 
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides, in part, as 
follows: 
(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may 
merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corpo­
rations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolida­
tion, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may 
be, complying and approved in accordance with this section. 
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or 
consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or 
consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the 
merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) 
the amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviv­
ing corporation as are desired to be effected by the merger or consolidation, 
or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a statement that the cer­
tificate of incorporation of 1 of the constituent corporations shall be the cer­
tificate of incorporation of the surviving or resulting corporation; (4) the 
manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into 
shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the 
merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corpora­
tions are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the 
surviving or resulting corporation, the cash, property, rights or securities of 
any other corporation which the holders of such shares are to receive in 
exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares and the surrender of the 
certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any 
other corporation may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other se­
curities of the surviving or resulting corporation; and (5) such other details 
or provisions as are deemed desirable, including, without limiting the gen­
erality of the foregoing, a provision for the payment of cash in lieu of the 
issuance or recognition of fractional shares, interests or rights, or for any 
other arrangement with respect thereto, consistent with the provisions of 
§ 155 of this title. The agreement so adopted shall be executed in accordance 
with § 103 of this title. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or 
consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of 
such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate 
upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the 
agreement of merger or consolidation. 
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be 
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or 
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of 
the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of 
stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at his address as it 
appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of 
the meeting. At the meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote 
taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of 
the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of 
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The Magnavox directors agreed to a merger in which TMC would 
be the surviving corporation and called a meeting of the stock­
holders of Magnavox for July 24, 1975 to approve the merger. They 
sent a proxy statement to the stockholders in June of 1975, again 
with full disclosure of the ultimate effect of the merger on the 
stockholders. At the stockholder's meeting the proposed merger 
was approved. 
The minority stockholders filed suit charging that the merger 
was fraudulent since it lacked any business purpose other than a 
freeze-out of the minority stockholders at an inadequate price. The 
offer price was nine dollars ($9) as compared to a book value of ten 
dollars and sixteen cents ($10.16) per share. 10 The minority also 
alleged that the board had breached its fiduciary duty by approving 
the merger at an inadequate price. The minority's final argument 
was that the proxy statements violated the anti-fraud provision of 
the Delaware securities act. ll Specifically, the minority stockhold­
ers alleged that the proxy materials contained false and misleading 
statements and failed to disclose material facts. They pointed out 
that the proxy materials did not mention the Magnavox directors' 
initial opposition to Development's tender offer, the substantial dif­
ference between the book value of Magnavox shares and the offer 
price, or the employment contracts offered to sixteen Magnavox 
officers in return for the Magnavox board's support of the tender 
offer. 12 
The majority stockholders argued that their actions were fully 
authorized by the Delaware long form merger statute and fully 
complied with that act. The majority contended that the minority's 
the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the agreement by the secretary 
or assistant secretary of the corporation. If the agreement shall be so adopted 
and certified by each constituent corporation, it shall then, in addition to the 
execution required by subsection (b) of this section, be executed, acknowl­
edged and filed and shall become effective, in accordance with § 103 of this 
title. It shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county of this 
State in which the registered office of each such constituent corporation is 
located; or if any of the constituent corporations shall have been specially 
created by a public act of the General Assembly, then the agreement shall 
be recorded in the county where such corporation had its principal place of 
business in this State.... 
10. 380 A.2d at 972. 
11. While the anti-fraud provisions of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (Michie 
1974), which require full disclosure of all material facts in proxy solicitations, were 
argued in the case, they did not playa major part in the court's decision and are not 
considered in this discussion. 
12. 380 A.2d at 980 n,13. 
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only available remedy was appraisal as provided by Delaware law, 13 
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides in part, as 
follows: 
(a) Appraisal rights under this section shall be available only for the 
shares of any stockholder who has complied with subsection (b) of this sec­
tion and has neither voted in favor of the merger nor consented thereto in 
writing pursuant to § 228 of this title. When used in this section, the word 
"stockholder" means a holder of record of stock in a stock corporation and 
also a member of record of a non-stock corporation; the words "stock" and 
"share" mean and include what is ordinarily meant by those words and also 
membership or membership interest of a member of a nonstock corporation. 
(b) Appraisal rights under this section shall be determined as follows: 
(1) If a proposed merger or consolidation for which appraisal rights are 
provided under this section is to be submitted for approval at a meeting of 
stockholders, the corporation, not less than 20 days prior to the meeting, 
shall notify each of its stockholders entitled to such appraisal rights that ap­
praisal rights are available for any or all of the shares of the constituent 
corporations, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section. Each 
stockholder electing to demand the appraisal of his shares under this section 
shall deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger 
or consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of his shares. Such demand 
will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of 
the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the ap­
praisal of his shares; provided, however, that such demand must be in addi­
tion to and separate from any proxy or vote against the merger. Within 10 
days after the effective date of such merger or consolidation, the surviving 
corporation shall notify each stockholder of each constituent corporation who 
has complied with this subsection and has not voted in favor of or consented 
to the merger or consolidation of the date that the merger or consolidation 
has become effective; or 
(2) If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or 
§ 253 of this title, the surviving corporation, either before the effective date 
of the merger or within 10 days thereafter; shall notify each of the stockhold­
ers entitled to appraisal rights of the effective date of the merger or con­
solidation and that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares 
of the constituent corporations. A copy of this section shall be included in 
the notice. The notice shall be sent by certified or registered mail, return 
receipt requested, addressed to the stockholder at his address as it appears 
on the records of the corporation. Any stockholder entitled to appraisal rights 
may, within 20 days after the date of mailing of the notice, demand in writ­
ing from the surviving corporation the appraisal of his shares. Such demand 
will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of 
the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the ap­
praisal of his shares. 
(f) After the determination of the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, 
the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
merger. Upon application by any stockholder entitled to participate in the 
appraisal proceeding or by the corporation, the Court may, in its discretion, 
permit discovery or other pretrial proceedings and may proceed to trial upon 
the appraisal prior to the final determination of those other stockholders who 
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which allows a stockholder, dissatisfied with the price he receives 
for his or her shares, to demand a judicial appraisal of the fair value 
of the shares. The majority denied any violation of the Delaware 
anti-fraud statute and argued that even if it had made any misrep­
resentations in the proxy materials the minority did not rely on any 
such misrepresentations. 
Since the board of Magnavox was not disinterested14 and 
would benefit personally from employment contracts and stock op­
tions, the court could have used conventional principles to find a 
violation of the board's fiduciary duty, unless the board was able to 
prove the "entire fairness" of the merger. 15 Instead, the court took 
this opportunity to announce that a corporate merger controlled on 
both sides by the majority stockholders, even though fully in com­
pliance with the merger provisions of Delaware law, must have 
some "valid business purpose" other than the freeze-out of an un­
wanted minority.16 The court admitted that this test is undefined 
and "leads to questions such as, 'Whose purpose?' and 'What busi­
ness?,' "17 but it did not answer those questions. As a concurring 
opinion stated, "[t]he opinion waffies in its attempt to establish 
guidelines for future merger litigation with emphasis on the coined 
have complied with this section. Any stockholder whose name appears on 
the list filed by the corporation pursuant to subsection (d) of this section and 
who has submitted his certificates of stock to the Register in Chancery, if 
such is required, may participate fully in all proceedings until the Court 
shall determine that he is not entitled to appraisal rights under this section. 
(g) The court shall direct the payment of the appraised value of the 
shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting corpora­
tion to the stockholders entitled thereto upon the surrender to the corpora­
tion of the certificates representing such stock.... 
(h) The costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and 
taxed upon the parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances. 
Upon the application of any party in interest, the Court shall determine the 
amount of interest, if any, to be paid upon the value of the stock of the 
stockholders entitled thereto. In making its determination with respect to 
interest, the Court may consider all relevant factors, including the rate of 
interest which the corporation has paid for money it has borrowed, if any, 
during the pendency of the proceeding. Upon application of a stockholder, 
the Court may order all or a portion of the expenses incurred by any stock­
holder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without limi­
tation, reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be 
charged pro rata against the value of all of the shares entitled to an appraisal. 
14. At the time of the merger vote, four of the Magnavox directors were also on 
the North American board and three more had employment contracts and options on 
North American stock as of the effective date of the merger. 
15. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). 
16. 380 A.2d at 978-79. 
17. rd. at 976. 
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phrase 'business purpose' which standing alone connotes nothing 
magic or definitive. "18 
The earlier decisions which enunciated the "entire fairness" 
standard19 are still good law. They are supplemented by, but do 
not conflict with, the new "valid business purpose" test. As the 
"entire fairness" test developed, the parties objecting to the 
merger were required to prove such unfairness in the merger as to 
amount to constructive fraud. 20 Later, the courts required the par­
ties proposing the merger to prove the "entire fairness" of the 
merger when they were in control on both sides. 21 By requiring 
that some identifiable benefit must be gained by the freeze-out 
merger process other than the elimination of an unwanted minority 
interest, the "valid business purpose" test appears to be a further 
development of the duty imposed upon majority stockholders to 
deal fairly with minority stockholders.22 "Entire fairness" and "valid 
18. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 422 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E1, E8 (Del. 1977) 
(McNeilly, J., concurring) (quoted paragraph omitted from Atlantic Reporter). 
19. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 
1968); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). 
20. MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943). 
21. Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), aiI'd, 278 A.2d 467 
(Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 
1968). 
22. The result reached in Singer is the same result that the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reached both in Marshel v. A.F.W. Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 
(2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), and in Greene v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), by using rule 10(b)(5) (17 
C.F.R. 240.10(b)(5) (1975)) and § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C.A. 78(j)(b) (1970)). The court held that rule 1O(b)(5) was broad enough to reach 
the breach of a fiduciary duty in the absence of any actual fraud. In Marshel, which 
involved a cash-out merger under New York law, the court held that it was a viola­
tion of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1O(b)(5) to 
consummate a cash-out merger with no corporate purpose other than removal of the 
minority, since it involved a forced sale at a price determined by the majority and 
funded from the corporate treasury, regardless of appraisal rights and specifically did 
not decide the state law issues. 
Greene involved a short form merger under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 
(Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977), where all statutory requirements were met. The court 
held that rule 1O(b)(5) regards a freeze-out merger without a justifiable business pur­
pose and with low stock valuation and no notice to the minority as a fraud regardless 
of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure, which need not be proven. On appeal the 
Supreme Court held that rule 1O(b)(5) does not regulate the standard of fiduciary 
conduct because the area of corporate responsibility of majority stockholders is prop­
erly regulated by the states. The Supreme Court concluded that rule 1O(b)(5) does 
not apply in the absence of "manipulative or deceptive" practices which are terms of 
art referring to practices intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market 
activity. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Greene, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For other cases inter­
preting rule 1O(b)(5) in this area, see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); 
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business purpose now represent a two-step test which must be 
satisfied to justify a freeze-out merger. 
Although the Delaware Code authorizes appraisal of the shares 
of a minority stockholder who is dissatisfied with the price offered, 
the statute does not say that appraisal is an exclusive remedy for 
frozen-out minority stockholders. The courts have, however, 
applied the appraisal remedy as though it were exclusive. 23 In 
some of the earlier appraisal cases the courts differentiated be­
tween mergers under the Delaware long form merger statute and 
the short form merger statute24 on the basis of the statutory lan-
Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Levine v. Biddle Sawyer 
Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 
1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974). 
23. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 
1971) (appraisal held adequate remedy in freeze-out merger); Stauffer v. Standard 
Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311, af!'d, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962) 
(short form merger); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 
(1952) (question of valuation in a "stock for stock" merger); Federal United Corp. v. 
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940) (appraisal applied to loss of dividend 
rights by preferred stockholder in merger). 
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977) provides, in part, 
as follows: 
(a) In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each 
class of the stock of a corporation or corporations is owned by another corpo­
ration and 1 of the corporations is a corporation of this State and the other or 
others are corporations of this State or any other state or states or the District 
of Columbia and the laws of the other state or states or the District permit a 
corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another juris­
diction, the corporation having such stock ownership may either merge the 
other corporation or corporations into itself and assume all of its or their 
obligations, or merge itself, or itself and 1 or more of such other corpora­
tions, into 1 of the other corporations by executing, acknowledging and fil­
ing, in accordance with § 103 of this title, a certificate of such ownership 
and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of its board of directors to 
so merge and the date of the adoption; provided, however, that in case the 
parent corporation shall not own all the outstanding stock of all the sub­
sidiary corporations, parties to a merger as aforesaid, the resolution of the 
board of directors of the parent corporation shall state the terms and condi­
tions of the merger, including the securities, cash, property, or rights to be 
issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation upon surren­
der of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by 
the parent corporation. If the parent corporation be not the surviving corpo­
ration, the resolution shall include provision for the pro rata issuance of 
stock of the surviving corporation to the holders of the stock of the parent 
corporation on surrender of the certificates therefor, and the certificate of 
ownership and merger shall state that the proposed merger has been ap­
proved by a majority of the outstanding stock of the parent corporation enti­
tled to vote thereon at a meeting duly called and held after 20 days notice of 
the purpose of the meeting mailed to each such stockholder at his address as 
it appears on the records of the corporation. A certified copy of the certifi­
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guage. The courts reasoned that the short form merger statute au­
thorized the freeze-out merger while the long form statute did not 
and, therefore,' that appraisal was the exclusive remedy only for 
short form mergers. 25 In 1968, the Delaware legislature amended 
the long form merger statute, effectively eliminating this differ­
ence. 26 The amendment to the Delaware long form merger statute 
indicates a legislative intent to facilitate payment of cash for minor­
ity shares at the discretion of the boards of directors controlling the 
merger. The court in Singer, however, apparently chose to ignore 
the legislative intent behind the 1968 amendment. The court held 
that the payment of cash for shares is not solely at the discretion of 
the board and added the restriction of a "valid business purpose" to 
the usual restriction that the price paid for shares be fair. 
. The result in Singer is beneficial to minority stockholders who 
frequently consider the appraisal remedy inadequate since their 
purpose for owning shares is defeated by a cash payment even if 
the price received is fair. For instance, some stockholders believe 
that the stock will rise in value and that a cash payment deprives 
them of future gains. Others count on their shares for retirement 
income from dividends. A forced cash payment means the end of 
that income and possible future hardship. 
The Singer decision clearly indicates that the appraisal rem­
edy, long thought to be exclusive, is merely one among many 
available to the courts. The court specifically said that it "may grant 
such relief as it deems appropriate under the circumstances. "27 
Since the action involved in a suit by minority stockholders to 
vindicate their rights in an unfair merger is equitable in nature, 
cate shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in this State 
in which the registered office of each constituent corporation which is a cor­
poration of this State is located.... 
(d) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation 
party to a merger effected under this section is not owned by the parent 
corporation immediately prior to the merger, the stockholders of the sub­
sidiary Delaware corporation party to the merger shall have appraisal rights 
and the surviving corporation shall comply with paragraph (2) of subsection 
(b) of § 262 of this title. Thereafter, the surviving corporation and the stock­
holders shall have such rights and duties and shall follow the procedures 
set forth in subsections (c) to (j), inclusive, of § 262 of this title. 
25. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311, aff'd, 41 
Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). At the time the chancery court decided Stauffer, § 251 
allowed for payment of cash "in lieu of issuance of fractional shares of the resulting 
or surviving corporation." See 50 Del. Laws ch. 467, § 4 (effective July 18, 1955). 
26. 56 Del. Laws ch. 186, § 16 (effective Jan. 2, 1968). 
27. 380 A.2d at 980. 
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possible remedies include injunction or unraveling an accomplished 
me.rger. On the other hand, if the merger has a "valid business 
purpose," or if the" unfairness found in the merger relates solely to 
price paid to frozen-out stockholders, the appraisal remedy is 
adequate and is presumed to be exclusive. 
One month after its decision in Singer, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reviewed the "valid business purpose" test in Tanzer v. In­
ternational General Industries, Inc. 28 There, International General 
Industries (IGI) owned 81% of the outstanding common stock of 
Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok). On September 30, 1975, IGI formed 
KLK Corporation (KLK) in order to merge KLK with Kliklok. The 
boards of each of the corporations approved the merger plan and 
stockholder approval was obtained as required under the Delaware 
long form merger statute. Minority stockholders, dissenting from 
the propsed merger, asked the court of chancery for a preliminary 
injunction, arguing that the sole purpose of the merger was to 
serve the interest of IGI by freezing-out the minority. The majority 
responded that the merger was proposed because it would facilitate 
long-term financing of IGI and that facilitation of financing was a 
sufficient "business purpose." The court of chancery29 refused the 
injunction and a motion by the defendants for summary judgment. 
The minority appealed. By the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court of Delaware, the merger had been accomplished. The Su­
preme Court of Delaware stated the issue to be decided: 
Plaintiffs' argument amounts to this: a freeze-out merger 
imposed on a subsidiary corporation by a parent, and designed 
solely for the purpose of benefiting the parent, is impermissible 
under Delaware law. Defendants, on the other hand, contend 
that the merger was for a valid business reason and is permissible 
under [the Delaware long form merger statute]; in addition, 
they say that the price offered in connection with the merger is 
intrinsically fair. 30 
In Tanzer, the court reviewed the Singer decision noting that 
"Singer determines that a cash-out of minority stockholders, when 
that is the sole purpose of a merger, is a violation of a fiduciary duty 
owed to them by a majority stockholder. "31 The court then turned 
to the Singer court's "valid business purpose" language and found 
28. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). 
29. [d. at 1122. 
30. [d. at 1123. 
31. [d. 
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it ambiguous. The Tanzer court observed that the phrase "valid 
business purpose" is not descriptive of the actual interest-weighing 
test to be applied. 32 It suggested that what is really involved is a 
balancing of the right of majority stockholders to vote their own in­
terest against the duty of those same stockholders to minority stock­
holders.33 After balancing IGI's interest in facilitating long-term 
debt financing against its duty to Kliklok's minority stockholders, 
the court stated that the purpose established by IGI was a bona fide 
purpose for the merger. 34 
While the court in Tanzer moved away from the "valid busi­
ness purpose" language of Singer, Tanzer nevertheless supports the 
view that corporate motives underlying freeze-out mergers are to 
be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Once the concept of a "valid busi­
ness purpose" has been more clearly defined through case law, 
that test will become more focused. The "valid business purpose" 
concept should then be a helpful clarification of the fiduciary duty 
of a majority stockholder in the merger situation. 
Now that the Delaware courts have articulated the "valid busi­
ness purpose" test, one must attempt to predict what the courts 
will find acceptable as "valid business purposes." In Tanzer, al­
though the court did not define what purposes other than facilita­
tion of long-term debt financing will be acceptable, any bona fide 
purpose of the majority should be sufficient to support the majority's 
right to vote its own interest even if minority interests are dam­
aged. Valid purposes would include streamlining of the corpo­
rate structure in order to eliminate duplication of jobs and thereby 
increase profits, mergers to gain tax benefits, and any other pur­
pose which can be shown to have a beneficial effect on either cor­
poration involved in the merger. Some purposes clearly will not 
support that right. 35 Where a majority seeks to justifY its actions on 
32. [d. 
33. For cases discussing the right of a majority stockholder to vote her own 
interest, see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Comb. Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. 
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 151 
A. 303 (1930); Allied Chern. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 
486 (1923). 
34. 379 A.2d at 1125. The court then remanded the case for an "entire fairness" 
hearing as required by Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 
107 (1952). 
35. In recent years the literature has suggested a number of possible purposes, 
some of which may be invalid in the future. Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New 
Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Comment, Protection of Minority 
Shareholders from Freeze-outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976); 
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the basis of one purpose while its real purpose is either to elimi­
nate a dissident minority or to enrich itself at the expense of a 
minority stockholder, the courts will undoubtedly look to the true 
motive. Even if the use of the business purpose language disap­
pears through judicial disapproval in cases like Tanzer, the concept 
of a "valid business purpose" is sound as long as the courts remain 
concerned with the underlying reasons for freeze-out mergers. 
The rule of Singer and Tanzer is more demanding than the 
"business judgment" rule,36 which provides only that if corporate 
boards act in good faith the courts will not question the wisdom of 
. the boards' decisions. In practice, this often leads courts to take a 
hands-off attitude towards the boards' actions. The more intensive 
review required by Singer and Tanzer, although developed and 
discussed in the context of freeze-out mergers, can be applied to 
other methods by which corporations "go private," such as reverse 
stock splits, short form mergers,37 stock repurchase programs, and 
asset sales. 
While the final effect of the Singer/Tanzer rule is not yet clear, 
it is safe to say that it will be significant. Forty percent of the 
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorpo­
rated in Delaware, and therefore subject to Delaware law. It has 
been estimated that over 200 of the FORTUNE 500 Largest Indus­
trial Corporations are incorporated in Delaware. 38 Since the 
Singer/Tanzer rule grew out of the tension between the common 
law fiduciary duty of directors and control stockholders ~d the 
right of those same directors and control stockholders to vote their 
own interests when voting their shares, application of the rule 
should not be limited to Delaware corporations. If other states 
adopt the Singer/Tanzer rule as a way of balancing the competing 
Note, Goillg Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). Some purposes, such as escape from 
disclosure requirements, are objectionable on policy grounds, while others, such as 
removal of pressure from management to show high profits in spite of long range 
negative effects, are more valid. Only time, and a case by case development in the 
courts, will tell. 
36. 379 A.2d at 1124. 
37. The court, in both Sillger and Tanzer, was concerned with the Delaware 
long form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977). 
Although the Sillger decision was specifically restricted to long form mergers, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery has since held that the SillgerlTanzer rule also applies 
to short form mergers, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977). 
Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). 
38. Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976). 
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interests of majority and minority shareholders when public corpo­
rations "go private," the "valid business purpose" approach may 
soon become the majority rule. 39 
Allan A. Campbell, Jr. 
39. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same result in 
Greene v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977). This indicates a judiciarbelief that the Singer/Tanzer rule is equitable. The 
Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, did not find the result incorrect. 
The Court instead criticized the method of reaching the result. See note 22 supra. 
